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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract dispute primarily concerning the interpretation of the 
Statute of Frauds original obligation exception Idaho Code § 9-506(2) and the "Main 
Purpose Rule." Bailey contends the trial court erred when it found as a matter of law 
that the contractual arrangement was intended to be a guaranty. Bailey contends AMF 
and Peritus were joint debtors in a surety relationship. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Bailey filed a complaint for breach of written and oral contracts and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims against his employer, a start-up company, 
American Medical File, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "AMF"), Peritus I Asset 
Management, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "Peritus"), the company financing the 
start-up AMF, and Ronald J. Heller, David J. Desmond, and William R. Espinosa, 
individuals and officers of AMF and Peritus. The Defendants all filed motions to dismiss 
based on the pleadings. The Court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim on the pleadings and dismissed the contract claims against the individual 
defendants finding the individuals signed the contracts "as representatives of Peritus I 
Asset Management and/or members of the Board of Directors of American Medical 
File." (R, pp. 000048 - 49.) 
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This dispute was set for trial to commence July 19, 2016. A Notice of Bankruptcy 
filing by AMF was filed with the Court May 26, 2015, and therefore all claims against 
AMF were stayed. Peritus filed its Motion for Summary Judgment March 21, 2016, 
claiming "Bailey's claim that Peritus promised to pay wages owed by AMF does not 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds." (R, p. 00268) Bailey filed an Affidavit of Shawn Bailey 
and a Memorandum of Law Opposing Summary Judgment contending, "the Statute of 
Frauds does not apply to original obligations per I.C. § 9-506 and the "Main Purpose 
Rule" adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court. (R, pp. 000281-284). On May 11, 2016, 
Bailey filed a Motion to Amend Complaint attaching a proposed Amended Complaint 
which specifically plead I.C. § 9-506(2). (R, pp. 000331-352.) 
After a hearing May 19, 2016, the Court entered an Order Granting Summary 
Judgment to Peritus (R, pp. 000362-372) and an Order Denying Motion for Leave to 
Amend the Complaint (R, pp. 999373-376) on the basis that the contract was a 
guaranty and that the Statute of Frauds precluded recovery against Peritus. A 
Judgment was entered June 14, 2016. Bailey filed a Notice of Appeal July 22, 2016 (R, 
p. 000383). 
C. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Three Parties to the Written and Oral Contracts. 
(a) AMF 
American Medical File (herein referred to as "AMF") was incorporated in 
California November 7, 2001 by Joel Rayden and Scot Anderson for the purpose of 
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developing personal health record (PHR) software for use in the medical and health 
insurance industries. (See Aff. Of Shawn Bailey, para. 15 -17, R, p. 000307). 
In 2004 a few of Peritus' clients became interested in investing in AMF so Peritus 
formed a limited partnership entity as a vehicle to invest in AMF. Peritus formed the 
Peritus Giobal Opportunity Fund Limited Partnership which invested $6.45 million in 
AMF in addition to a "bridge Joan." When AMF defaulted by failing to repay the bridge 
loan in 2005 the Peritus Fund (hereinafter referred to as "PGO Fund") foreclosed and 
became the owner of a majority of AMF stock. (See Aff. of Ronald Heller, para. 4, R, p. 
000224.) 
In 2008 the PGO Fund stopped investing in AMF and dissolved. The AMF 
shares held by the PGO fund were distributed on a pro-rated basis back to the Peritus 
clients. (See Aff. of Ronald Heller, para. 5, R, p. 000224.) 
After December 31, 2008, Peritus itself began making direct loans to fund AMF. 
(Aff. of Ron Heller, para. 6, R, p. 000224.) Between August 4, 2008, and September 
12, 2011, Peritus loaned AMF at least $842,350.00. Bailey was personally aware of the 
cash Peritus supplied to AMF to pay overhead expenses on a monthly basis. Peritus 
employees told Bailey at times Peritus was making loans and at other times buying 
stock. Bailey did not see any formal loan agreements and none were produced by 
Peritus in this litigation to Bailey's knowledge. (Aff. of Shawn Bailey, para. 21, R, pp. 
000309-10.) 
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Bailey estimated AMF's "burn rate" of funds was approximately $40,000.00 per 
month for employees, rent, consultants, and other operating expenses. Although not all 
bills got paid, Peritus raised substantial sums of money, largely from its clients, to pay 
AMF overhead. (Aff. of Shawn Bailey, para. 20, R, p. 000309 and Exhibit "C," R, pp. 
000319-321.) 
AMF filed bankruptcy and the Court in this case was notified May 26, 2015 (R, p. 
00004.) 
(b) PERITUS 
Peritus is an investment advisory company that provides investment 
management services to investors. Peritus advises clients on investment opportunities 
and is paid a fee for its advice and for managing client investments. (Aff. of Ronald 
Heller, para. 3, R, p. 000224). 
Peritus employee R. J. Dundas worked for both Peritus and as the "AMF pro tern 
CEO" when he recruited Bailey to work at AMF in late 2005. (R, p. 000305, Aff. of 
Shawn Bailey, para. 9.) Bailey met with Peritus employees R. J. Dundas, David 
Desmond, and Tim Gramatovich in Santa Barbara, California for his job interview in 
February 2006. Bailey received a job offer March 10, 2006, to work at AMF. The job 
offer was made by Ronald J. Heller as President of Peritus I Asset Management, LLC, 
Managing Director Peritus Global Opportunity Fund, LP, and David Desmond as Chief 
Operating Officer Peritus I Asset Management, LLC. (R, pp. 000315 - 16) {R, p. 
000306, para. 13.) While Bailey was employed at AMF, AMF business generated 
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revenues of only $2,500.00 per month. Peritus made loans and invested client money 
into AMF to meet its financial obligations (estimated to be $37,500.00 per month. 
$40,000.00 per month overhead less $2,500.00 per month AMF revenue.) (R, p. 
000308, para. 18 and 19.) Over time, Peritus failed to make contributions to AMF to 
pay Bailey's salary. By late July or early August 2011, Bailey was owed $95,000.00 in 
back pay. (R, pp. 000308-309, para. 19 and 20.) Bailey quit working for AMF in late 
July 2011 due to the $95,000.00 in back pay. Peritus officers Ronald Heller and David 
Desmond contacted Bailey and requested him to return to work. Bailey told them he 
would not return to work until he received a written contract signed by Peritus in which 
Peritus was obligated to fund Bailey's salary at AMF. Bailey was provided a written 
contract of employment signed by Ronald J. Heller, President of Peritus I Asset 
Management, LLC, and David Desmond, Chief Operating Officer of Peritus I Asset 
Management, LLC. (R, pp. 000325-26.) In Bailey's opinion, the contract was drafted by 
Heller and Desmond. (R, p. 000311, para. 25.) Based upon all of the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the contract including the discussions, the prior letter offer of 
employment (2006), Peritus' history of funding AMF operations (2004 - 2011 ), and the 
written employment contract provided to Bailey in 2011, Bailey understood Peritus was 
obligated to fund Bailey's compensation. Bailey would not have returned to work at 
AMF without the written contract signed by the Peritus officers. (R, p. 000311, para. 25 
-26.) 
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(c) BAILEY 
in late 2005 Bailey was employed at Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
and was tasked with the responsibility to convert patient health records (PHR's) from 
paper files to secure online patient health records. While at St. Alphonsus, Bailey 
recommended the purchase of the AMF software system. St. Alphonsus was one of the 
pioneers in using the AMF PHR system. (R, pp. 000304-305). As a result of that 
experience with AMF, Bailey eventually received an offer of employment from Ronald J. 
Heller, President of Peritus I Asset Management, LLC and David J. Desmond Chief 
Operating Officer of Peritus I Asset Management, LLC. (R, p. 000306, para. 13 and Ex. 
"A", R, pp. 000315-16). Bailey worked at AMF from April 1, 2006, until he left March 20, 
2013 as a result of missed compensation payments between October 31, 2012 and 
March 20, 2013. (R., p. 000312, para. 27 - 28.) Bailey contends he is entitled to 
$40,119.05 for payments missed after January 1, 2012, plus $300,000.00 in severance 
benefits under the written contract. (R, p. 000313.) 
2. AMF and Peritus Were Jointly Obligated to Pay Bailey. 
Although AMF was a separate corporation from Peritus, it is clear Peritus was the 
source of funding and managing the start-up venture. Peritus created the PGO Fund in 
2004 which invested $6.45 million in AMF and extended a "bridge loan" in an unknown 
amount. After the PGO Fund was dissolved in 2008, Peritus continued to loan money 
to AMF. 
6. After the PGO Fund dissolved, Peritus began loaning 
funds to AMF. Those loans, along with loans from other 
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non-Peritus sources, are reflected in financial reports 
prepared by AMF's outside accountant. (Aft. of Ronald 
Heller, R, p. 000224, para 6 and Exhibits "A" and "B" 
attached (R, pp. 000228 - 252.)) 
The balance sheet Heller submitted shows AMF's long term liabilities totaling 
$15,076,946.88. Peritus clients invested $6,950,000.00 through the PGO Fund Peritus 
created and then dissolved. Peritus itself shows $811,852.06 loaned on the balance 
sheet as of September 30, 2011 (R, p. 000246). Bailey claims Peritus was "managing 
AMF" when he became employed at AMF and that in 2006 Peritus committed to "fund 
the expansion of AMF after April 1, 2006," and that between April 2007 and October 10, 
2011, "Peritus was solely responsible for raising funds from investors to finance the 
business." (R, p. 000308) 
Bailey's understanding of the Peritus commitment to fund and manage AMF is 
corroborated by the written letters sent to Bailey from Peritus. His initial employment 
offer dated March 10, 2006, was only signed by Ronald Heller and David Desmond in 
their Peritus and/or PGO capacities. (R, pp. 000315-16) 
After Bailey quit in July 2011 due to non-payment of his salary, Heller and 
Desmond contacted Bailey requesting him to return to work. In the conversations 
preceding the written letter contract Bailey claims: 
23. I was contacted by Ron Heller and Dave Desmond of 
Peritus and they requested I return to work. I told them I 
would not return to work until I received a written contract 
signed by Peritus in which Peritus was obligated to fund my 
salary. 
* * * * 
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24. Attached as Exhibit "E" (and also attached to the 
Complaint) is the written and signed contract Peritus 
provided to me which they represented fulfilled my demand 
for a binding contract from Peritus to ensure payment of my 
salary. I understood I was an employee of the start-up 
company AMF but that Peritus was obligated to fund my 
employment by virtue of the contract Peritus President, 
Ronald Heller and Peritus COO, David Desmond, signed ... 
. (R, p. 000310) 
As stated in Bailey's affidavit, Bailey's understanding of the contract making AMF 
and Peritus joint obligors is entirely consistent with the course of conduct after April 1, 
2006, the verbal discussions and the written correspondence and contracts signed by 
AMF, Peritus, and Bailey. Bailey contends the arrangement does not fall within the 
Statute of Frauds because of the "Main Purpose Rule" and I.C. § 9-506(2) "surety 
exception" to the Statute of Frauds. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Bailey contends the trial court erred when it denied Bailey's motion to amend 
his complaint to specifically allege the "Main Purpose Rule: and I.C. § 9-506(2) surety 
exception to the Statute of Frauds affirmative defense. 
2. The trial court misinterpreted the Statute of Frauds "Main Purpose Rule." 
3. The trial court misinterpreted I.C. § 9-506(2) surety exception. 
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Ill. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
This is a commercial transaction. The prevailing party shall be entitled to an 
award of attorney fees per I.C. § 12-120(3). Mickelsen Construction, Inc. v. Horrocks, 
154 Idaho 396, 299 P.3d 203,212 (2013). 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same 
standard the district court used in relying on the motion. Peritus had the burden to 
prove there was no genuine issue of any material fact and is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Wright v. Ada County, Docket No. 42999 (2016 Opinion No. 74). The 
Supreme Court exercises free review over issues of law. Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. 
Valley County, 154 Idaho 486,490, 300 P.3d 18, 22 (2013). 
Where the evidence is all in the form of depositions, affidavits, and documents, 
the trial court's findings of fact are not binding on the Supreme Court. D & M 
Development Company v. Sherwood and Roberts. Inc., 92 Idaho 200 at 204 (1969). 
In every contract there are both express and implied terms. 
In every contract there exist not only the express promises 
set forth in the contract but all such implied provisions as are 
necessary to effectuate the intention of the parties, and as 
arise from the specific circumstances under which the 
contract was made. 
Davis v. Professional Business Services, 109 Idaho 810 at 813 (1985). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9 
In this case the agreement of the parties is established by conduct, oral promises 
and written documents as well as the financial circumstances of AMF and Peritus. A 
review of all evidence by the trier of fact is warranted to establish intent. 
This Court has consistently held that it cannot make the 
contract for the parties, and that it is only when interpretation 
of ambiguous terms of a contract is required, are questions 
of fact presented for determination. 
Minidoka Co. v. Krueger, 88 Idaho 395, 416 (1965). 
The written contract at issue in this case as well as the course of performance 
establishes a joint obligation by AMF and Peritus to pay Bailey. AMF and Peritus 
signed the contract,. Peritus admits both Peritus and AMF supplied funds to pay Bailey 
throughout the course of their relationship. There is no evidence of a "guaranty 
relationship." 
The main distinction between a contract of guaranty and a 
contract of suretyship is that a surety is typically jointly and 
severally liable with the principal obliger on an obligation to 
which they are both bound, while a guarantor typically 
contracts to fulfill an obligation upon the default of the 
principal obligor. Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and 
Guaranty § 1, cmt. C. (1996). 
Valley National Bank v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 254 F.2d 448 at 
453 (S.O.N.Y 2003.) 
V. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT. 
Procedurally this case is similar to Mickelsen Construction. Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 
Idaho 396, 299 P.3d 203 (2013) where the Plaintiff argued on appeal that I.C. § 9-
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506(2) applied as an exception to the Statute of Frauds. However, in the complaint, 
Mickelsen had claimed Horrocks' promise to pay Mickelson was a "guaranty." The 
Supreme Court ruled the two concepts were "mutually exclusive" and disallowed the 
argument noting: 
If a plaintiff facing a motion for summary judgment decides it 
has alleged the wrong claim for relief or wants to raise 
another claim, the plaintiff must amend its complaint. 
Because Mickelsen Construction did not do so in this case, 
its argument that Ms. Horrocks was not a guarantor but 
instead was a principal debtor cannot be considered on 
appeal. 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396 at 
_, 299 P.3d 203 at 212. (2013) 
Unlike Mickelsen, Bailey followed the precise procedure set forth by this Court in 
Mickelsen. After Peritus filed its Summary Judgment Motion relying on Bailey's general 
allegation of a "guarantee" (R, 00012, para. 11), Bailey filed a motion to amend his 
complaint to raise the I.C. § 9-506(2) surety defense to the Statute of Frauds. (See R, 
p. 000338, para. 12, and R, p. 000341, para. 26, 29, and R, p. 000341 para. 30 - 32.) 
Therefore, Bailey timely raised the original obligation "surety" claim and "Main Purpose 
Rule" issues. Bailey contends a guaranty and surety arrangement are oftentimes 
confused and are generally similar according to many legal scholars. The initial pleading 
error should not prevent the court from deciding a dispute on the merits. 
Not to belabor the issue, but Bailey contends this Court should reconsider its 
wording in Mickelsen which results in illogical pleading requirements for claimants 
asserting breach of contract claims. Bailey contends his original pleading properly set 
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forth a breach of contract cause of action which is all that is required in a complaint. A 
copy of the written contract was attached and incorporated in the complaint. It is illogical 
to require a claimant to assert in its complaint an exception to an affirmative defense. 
The Statute of Frauds is an affirmative defense. See I.R.C.P. 8(c)(1)(P). 
(C.) Affirmative defenses. 
(1) In general. In responding to a pleading, a party 
must affirmatively state any avoidance or 
affirmative defense, including; 
(P} statue of frauds; 
In the event a defendant raises the Statute of Frauds affirmative defense, all 
parties are on notice of that issue. Either party can thereafter address the affirmative 
defense in a summary judgment motion where an exception will undoubtedly arise. It is 
illogical to require a plaintiff to assert in a complaint an exception to an affirmative 
defense when the claimant contends the Statute of Frauds does not apply. Again, the 
Statute of Frauds is an affirmative defense, a burden on the defendant. It has always 
been Bailey's position that the written, signed contract is outside the Statute of Frauds. 
The promise by Peritus to pay was an enforceable oral agreement to which the Statute 
of Frauds does not apply. 
Further, a party may specifically and expressly make inconsistent claims like 
surety vs. guaranty. Inconsistent pleadings are allowed by Supreme Court rule. 
I.R.C.P 8(d)(3) Inconsistent claims or defenses. A party 
may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, 
regardless of consistency. (Emphasis added.) 
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To be clear, when I drafted the complaint claiming that "Peritus would guarantee 
payment of Bailey's salary" on or about April 12, 2007, the word "guarantee" was used 
as a synonym of "assurance." Further, it referred to a 2007 oral agreement, not the 
written 2011 agreement and the oral "assurances" which are the subject of this lawsuit. 
Counsel respectfully requests the Court to reconsider the intent of "notice pleading." 
The Statute of Frauds issue is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the 
Defendant. If the defense does not raise the defense it is waived. Requiring the 
claimant to raise the affirmative defense and then also raise the defense that the Statute 
of Frauds does not apply creates an unfair burden on the Plaintiff. In effect it requires 
the Plaintiff to raise an affirmative defense that the Plaintiff contends does not apply. 
8. THE PROMISE OF PERITUS DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS PURSUANT TO THE "MAIN PURPOSE RULE." 
The "Main Purpose Rule" is a universally accepted rule of law. When an oral 
promise is made by a "third party" to pay a creditor of the original promiser in order to 
advance the economic interest of the third party, the promise is not within the Statute of 
Frauds. This has been the law in the U.S. since at least 1891 and is still the law as 
reflected by the Restatement of Contracts (Second). 
§116 Main Purpose: Advantage to Surety. 
A contract that all or part of a duty of a third person to the 
promise shall be satisfied is not within the Statute of Frauds 
as a promise to answer for the duty of another if the 
consideration for the promise is in fact or apparently desired 
by the promiser mainly for his own economic advantage, 
rather than in order to benefit the third person. 
Restatement ( Second) of Contracts § 116 ( 1981 ) . 
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The Restatement explains the rationale for the rule which is perfectly rational and 
logical. If a third person makes a promise for his own benefit, he really isn't a "third 
person" because he has a financial benefit not unlike the primary debtor. 
a. Rationale. This section states what is often called the 
"main purpose;, or ''leading object" rule. Where the 
surety-promisor's main purpose is his own pecuniary or 
business advantage, the gratuitous or sentimental 
element often present in suretyship is eliminated, the 
likelihood of disproportion in the values exchanged 
between promisor and promise is reduced, and the 
commercial context commonly provides evidentiary 
safeguards. Thus, there is less need for cautionary or 
evidentiary formality than in other cases of suretyship. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 116 a. Rationale. 
The "Main Purpose Rule" has been recognized in America since at least 1891 
when the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Statute of Frauds and "Main Purpose 
Rule" in Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 12 S. Ct. 58 (1891) which involved a factual 
scenario very similar to this case. Patrick, the creditor, agreed to continue hauling ore 
under a contract with the Flagstaff Mining Company (the primary debtor). Davis (the 
third party promisor) was owed money by the Flagstaff Mining Company and wanted the 
ore converted to money so his debt would also get paid by the Flagstaff Mining 
Company. Consequently, Davis orally promised Patrick to "guaranty him to be paid." 
Q: What did he say in that connection to A.S. Patrick about 
continuing on in the hauling of the ores? 
A: He required him to continue in the hauling of the ores. 
He requested him to do it. 
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Q: In response to Mr. Davis to that request, what did Mr. 
Patrick say? 
A: He said to Mr. Davis if he would guaranty him to be paid 
he would continue to work, and Davis said he would see him 
paid. 
Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479 at486 (1891). 
The U. S. Supreme Court ruled under the "Main Purpose Rule," the oral promise 
did not fall within the Statute of Frauds. The facts showed Patrick was motivated to help 
his own financial and economic interest. 
While the original promisor was the mining company, and 
the undertaking was for its benefit, yet the performance of 
the contract inured equally to the benefit of Davis and the 
mining company. Performance helped the mining company 
in the payment of its debt to Davis, and at the same time 
helped Davis to secure the payment of the mining 
company's debt to him; and as the mining company was 
apparently destitute of any other property, and the payment 
of its debt to Davis, therefore, depended upon the continued 
and successful working of this mine . . . . He therefore, in 
any true sense of the term occupied not the position of a 
collateral undertaker, but that of an original promiser, and it 
would be a shadow on justice if the administration of the law 
relieved him from the burden of his promise on the ground 
that it also resulted to the benefit of the mining company, his 
debtor. 
Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1891) (Emphasis added.) 
Idaho has adopted the Main Purpose Rule. The primary issue is to determine 
the motivation of the joint debtor. 
The Main Purpose Rule provides that where the promisor 
(the owner) "has for his object a benefit which he did not 
enjoy before his promise, which benefit accrues immediately 
to himself, his promise is original, whether made before, 
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after, or at the time of the promise of the third party (the 
general contractor), notwithstanding that the "affect" is to 
promise to pay or discharge the debt of another. In order for 
the rule to apply, there must be consideration for the owner's 
promise and the consideration must be beneficial to him. 
Treasure Valley Plumbing & Heating. Inc. v. Earth 
Resources Co., Inc. 115 Idaho at 378-79. 
Another explanation from another court which followed the Restatement of 
Suretyship and Guarantee makes the purpose of the rule even clearer. 
According to Rosewood, Caterpillars promise falls outside 
the Statute of Frauds pursuant to the "Main Purpose" or 
"Leading Object" Rule. Under this rule, when the "Main 
Purpose" or "Leading Object" of the promisor/surety is to 
subserve or advance his own pecuniary or business 
interests, the promise does not fall within the statute. P. 
Alces, Law of Suretyship and Guarantee, sec. 4:19 (1996). 
As section 11 of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and 
Guaranty states: A contract that all or part of the duty of the 
principal obliger to the obligee shall be satisfied by the 
secondary obliger is not within the Statute of Frauds as a 
promise to answer for the duty of another if the consideration 
for the promise is in fact or apparently desired by the 
secondary obliger mainly for its own economic benefit, rather 
than the benefit of the principal obliger. Restatement (Third) 
of Suretyship and Guarantee, sec. 11(3)(c) at 42 (1996). 
See also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sec. 116 at 
299 (1981). 
The reason for the "Main Purpose" or "Leading Object" Rule 
has been explained: "where the secondary obliger's main 
purpose is its own pecuniary or business advantage, the 
gratuitous or sentimental element often present in suretyship 
is eliminated, the likelihood of disproportion and the values 
exchanged between secondary obliger and obligee is 
reduced, and the commercial context commonly provides 
evidentiary safeguards. Thus, there is less need for 
cautionary or evidentiary formality than in other secondary 
obligations. Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and 
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Guaranty, sec. 11, comment to Section (3)(c) at 49-50 
(1996). 
See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sec. 116, 
comment a at 299 (1981); 72 Am Jur 2d Statute of Frauds 
sec. 134 at 658 (2001) ("Cases sometimes arise in which, 
although a third party is the primary debtor, the promisor has 
a personal, immediate, and pecuniary interest in the 
transaction, and is therefore himself a party to be benefited 
by the performance of the promisee. In such cases the 
reason which underlies and which prompted this statutory 
provision fails, and the courts will give effect to the 
promise.)" 
Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 877 N.E. 2d 
1091 at 1099. (Emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court of Illinois went on to state that the Main Purpose or Leading 
Object Rule set out in the Restatement has been part of Illinois law since 1873 and that 
a majority of jurisdictions have adopted this rule as well. Rosewood Care Center. Inc. v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 877 N.E. 2d 1091 at 1099-1100. 
In this case the evidence is undisputed that Peritus had a strong financial 
incentive to assist AMF by paying AMF's employee, Bailey. Peritus had advised Peritus 
clients to invest in AMF and Peritus itself loaned significant sums of money to AMF. 
Peritus may have been a stockholder although that issue is disputed. Peritus had a 
long history of raising money to capitalize AMF expecting the investment to succeed. 
Peritus was faced with losing its own money as well as its investors' money if its Chief 
Technology Officer left the company. Therefore, Peritus persuaded Bailey to continue 
working at AMF by acting as a surety in the transaction. It is highly unlikely Peritus was 
motivated to assist non-Peritus stockholders of AMF. There has been no evidence 
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submitted to support that claim. The only evidence shows Peritus was extremely 
involved in running and financing the operations of AMF to benefit Peritus and Peritus 
investors that relied on Peritus to invest and manage their money wisely and 
productively. This was not an isolated incident but a continuous course of action for at 
least six years. Peritus received the bargained for consideration of Bailey's time and 
expertise for six years. The terms of the contract cannot be disputed. Peritus was an 
original, primary promisor. The Statute of Frauds does not apply. At best there is an 
issue of fact for a jury to determine intent. Summary Judgment for Peritus must be 
reversed. 
C. I.C. § 9-506(2) EXCEPTION APPLIES. 
The trial court rejected Bailey's argument that I.C. § 9-506(2) applied and found 
the "original obligation exception does not apply as a matter of law." (R., p. 000370.) 
The Court went on to explain its reliance on Mickelsen Const, Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 
Idaho 396,299 P.3d 203 (2013) for the proposition that "the original obligation exception 
does not apply when the creditor contends that the original debtors are still liable on the 
debt" (R, p. 000370) quoting the Horrocks decision. Bailey acknowledges that finding 
accurately refers to the Horrocks decision. However, that finding in the Horrocks 
decision is not found in the express language of the statute or the law of surety. In fact, 
it is inconsistent with the law of surety and the statute. I.C. § 9-506(2) provides: 
9-506. Original obligations - Writing not needed. - A promise 
to answer for the obligation of another, in any of the following 
cases, is deemed an original obligation of the promisor, and 
need not be in writing: 
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2. Where the creditor parts with value, or enters into an 
obligation in consideration of the obligations in respect to which 
the promise is made in terms or under circumstances such as to 
render the party making the promise the principal debtor, and 
the person in whose behalf it is made, his surety. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In this case, Peritus made a promise to answer for the obligation of AMF as 
contemplated in the first paragraph of the statute. Under paragraph 2, the "creditor 
parts with value" phrase refers to Bailey's agreement to provide Chief Technology 
Officer services. "Under circumstances such as to render" (Peritus) the "principal 
debtor'' and AMF "his" surety for Peritus. This statute clearly contemplates two obligors, 
both of whom are liable on the debt. Nowhere does the statute suggest the creditor can 
only pursue one obliger. That would defeat the purpose of the statute. 
Given the factual scenario before this Court, I.C. § 9-506(2) clearly applies. For 
six years Peritus had been supplying AMF around $37,500.00 per month in funding to 
pool with revenue from AMF of $2,500.00 per month to pay AMF's $40,000.00 per 
month overhead expense. Clearly, Peritus was always the "principal debtor" and the 
only way Peritus would get the money back is when AMF became successful and 
repaid Peritus out of its increased revenues and profits. The concept the statute "does 
not apply when the creditor contends that the original debtors are still liable on the debt" 
has no support from a reading of the statute. The statute clearly reflects an intention 
that both debtors would be liable. In a surety arrangement, Peritus can seek payment 
from AMF if Peritus pays the debt. In a surety arrangement, Bailey can seek payment 
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from both AMF and Peritus. They are joint debtors to Bailey. A more thorough 
discussion of surety law follows. The statute does not contain language supporting the 
Horrocks dicta relied upon by the trial court. 
1. The Difference Between Surety and Guarantor. 
After much research into the world of surety and guaranty, it is clear the two 
concepts are often confused and similar. This is an additional reason Bailey's original 
pleadings cannot be strictly adhered to where the two concepts are in play. A review of 
case law will show lawyers and lay people frequently confuse the two concepts. As 
stated by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank 
v. The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 789 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1986): 
In fact, the terms "surety" and "guarantor" often are used 
interchangeably, reflecting their nearly identical 
characteristics. Restatement of Security sec. 82 ( 1941 ); 
(other citation omitted). 
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'I Bank v. The Ohio Gas, Ins. 
Co., 789 F.2d 74 at 78 (1 51 Cir. 1986). (Emphasis added.) 
In that case the 1st Circuit Court cited the primary differences between a surety 
and a guarantor. One of the easiest distinctions is that a surety typically signs the same 
contract as the principal debtor whereas a guarantor typically does not. A guarantor 
normally would enter into a separate contract based on separate consideration. 
A suretyship is a contractual arrangement in which one 
party, the "surety," agrees to back up the obligation of 
another, termed the "principal" or "principal debtor," the latter 
bearing the primary burden of performing for the creditor. 
The term "surety'' is often used broadly to include all forms of 
suretyship, including the "guaranty." It also is used in a 
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narrow sense to indicate a direct. primary obligation to pay 
someone else's debt, as distinguished from the secondary, 
collateral obligation of a "guarantor." The difference 
between the primary obligation of the surety and the 
secondary obligation of the guarantor is that the surety joins 
the original contract with the principal and may be sued as 
an unconditional promiser along with the principal; the 
guarantor's liability arises from an independent agreement 
and is expressly conditional upon default by the principal. 
(Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'I Bank v. The Ohio Gas. Ins. 
Co., 789 F.2d 74 at 77-78 (1986). 
It should be noted, AMF and Peritus each signed Bailey's employment contract. 
The Court specifically assumed Peritus signed the employment contract. (R, p. 
000393.) The fact there was one contract signed by both is proof of a surety contract 
and joint obligation. This also proves it was not a guaranty. The fact there was one 
contract is a defining characteristic of an intent to be a "surety." 
Other authorities are in accord. In Howell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
69 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1934), the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals stated distinctions between 
suretyship, guaranty, and indemnity. 
There are recognized distinctions between suretyship, 
guaranty, and indemnity. 
A surety and guarantor are answerable for the debt, default, 
or miscarriage of another. Strictly speaking, the liability of a 
guarantor is secondary and collateral, and its enforcement 
depends upon certain conditions. The liability of a surety is 
original, primary, and direct. The surety is bound by the 
same agreement which binds his principal, while a guarantor 
is bound by his own independent undertaking. (Citation 
omitted.) In case of suretyship there is but one contract, 
binding the surety and the promisor, but in the case of a 
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guaranty there are two contracts, one binding the principal 
debtor, and one binding the guarantor. 
Howell v. Comm. Of Internal Revenue, 69 F.2d 447 at 450 
(8th Cir. 1934). 
In Commercial Money Center. Inc. v. Illinois Union Insurance Company, 
508 F.3rd 327 (6th Cir. 2007), the 5th Circuit determined a suretyship arrangement 
existed between Illinois Union Insurance Company and a leasing company which 
went bankrupt. Commercial Money Center, the Plaintiff sued Illinois Union 
Insurance Company alleging it was liable as a surety. The 5th Circuit addressed 
the issue of interpretation of contracts for purposes of determining whether a 
suretyship arrangement was made. The court found that where the contract is 
ambiguous, the court may resort to parol evidence to aid in the interpretation of 
the intent of the parties. 
To affirm we must find that the transaction as a whole 
unambiguously established a suretyship with Chase/Citi 
Bank as the intended obligee. Surety contracts are 
construed using the same rules that govern the interpretation 
of other contracts. (Citations omitted.) The language of the 
contract governs if it is clear and does not result in an 
absurdity; and the intention of the parties is to be 
ascertained, if possible, from the writing alone. See Cal. Civ. 
Code sec. 1638 and 1639. In discussing California law, this 
Court explained that a policy is ambiguous if its terms are 
reasonably susceptible of more than one construction, and 
that extrinsic evidence is admissible if it is "relevant to prove 
a meaning to which the language of the instrument is readily 
susceptible." (Citations omitted.) ("When a dispute arises 
over the meaning of contact language, the first question to 
be decided is whether the language is "reasonably 
susceptible" to the interpretation urged by the party. If it is 
not, the case is over.") (Citation omitted.) 
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Surety contracts and insurance contracts are conceptionally 
and legally distinct. The distinction, generally speaking, is 
that: an insurer undertakes to indemnify another "against 
loss, damage, or liability arising from an unknown or 
contingent event" whereas a surety promises to "answer for 
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another." The surety 
relationship is a tripartite one; it is a third party (the obligee). 
not the principal. who is protected, although the principal 
pays the premium. Furthermore, an insurer has no right of 
subrogation against its insured; a surety, on the other hand, 
is entitled to reimbursement by its principal. The fact that the 
endorsement purports to be part of an insurance policy 
providing collateral security insurance coverage is not 
dispositive, as no particular form of agreement is required to 
establish a suretyship as long as the agreement establishes 
the intention to create a surety contract. It is a substance of 
the transaction. not the form, that controls ("the existence of 
suretyship status depends upon the respective roles of the 
parties and the nature of the underlying transaction.") 
The Restatement similarly provides that when the criteria for 
suretyship are fulfilled. the secondary obliger has surety 
status regardless of, among other things, the form of the 
transaction. the terms used to describe the secondary 
obligor or the secondary obligation. or whether the 
secondary obligation is conditional or unconditional. 
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty, sec. 13) 
affirming determination that agreement although styled as an 
insurance contract, was a contract of suretyship). The 
Restatement also explains that a secondary obligor has the 
status of a surety when: 
(a) Pursuant to contract (the "secondary obligation"), 
an obligee has recourse against a person (the 
"secondary obliger") . . . with respect to the 
obligation (the "underlying obligation") of another 
person (the "principal obligor") to that obligee; and 
(b) To the extent that the underlying obligation or the 
secondary obligation is performed, the obligee is 
not entitled to performance of the obligation; and 
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(c) As between the principal obligor and the 
secondary obligor, it is the principal obligor who 
ought to perform the underlying obligation or bear 
the cost of performance. Restatement (Third) of 
Suretyship and Guar., sec. 1(a) (1996). 
Suretyship is described as involving a tripartite relationship 
consisting of a principal obligee who is owed a debt or duty; 
a principal obliger who is responsible for payment of the debt 
or performance of the duty; and a secondary obliger or 
surety who agrees to answer for the primary obliger's debt or 
duty. (Citations omitted.) 
Commercial Money Center, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 
508 F.3d 327 at 338-39 (6th Cir. 2007). (Emphasis added.) 
At issue in this lawsuit is whether the contract made between Peritus, AMF, and 
Bailey involves a surety relationship or a guarantee. Clearly, under Idaho law, a 
guarantee must be in writing and must contain a specific express promise of guarantee. 
A surety contract, by statute, need not be in writing. Therefore, determining whether the 
contract is a guaranty or surety, in the strict sense (a surety) is a critical issue. 
In the Mickelsen Construction v. Horrocks opinion, this Court addressed a factual 
situation which was clearly a guarantee arrangement. In that case, Mickelsen 
Construction, Inc. entered into a contract with Accelerated Paving, Inc. whereby 
Mickelsen provided asphalt on an Accelerated Paving job site. Under the contract, 
Mickelsen was owed $34,980.00 which Accelerated had failed to pay. (Ms. Horrocks 
was not a party to that contract.) Mickelsen threatened to file a lien against the 
property where the work was done. Clearly, in this situation, Accelerated was the 
primary obliger and Mickelsen Construction was the obligee. At some later time, Ms. 
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Horrocks wrote a check in the amount of $34,980.00 payable to Mickelsen out of Ms. 
Horrocks' business account. There was no evidence suggesting Ms. Horrocks was 
motivated by anything other than a friendship with Accelerated Paving. The Idaho 
Supreme Court found that the alleged guarantee by Ms. Horrocks was not enforceable 
because the check was not adequate evidence of a guarantee as required by the 
Statute of Frauds. The Court stated: 
In this case, the only document that could constitute a note 
or memorandum signed by Ms. Horrocks was the check. 
The only writing on the check, other than the date, the 
payee, the amount, and Ms. Horrocks' signature, was 
"ACCEL" written on the memo line, which began with the 
word "For." That would indicate that the check was "for 
Accel," but nothing more. A guarantee is an undertaking or 
promise on the part of a guarantor which is collateral to a 
primary or principal obligation and binds the guarantor to 
performance in the event of non-performance of the principal 
obligor. The check does not show any intent by either of the 
defendants to be liable for the obligation of some other 
person or entity, it does not name or identify the person or 
entity that is primarily liable and it does not specify what 
obligation of that person or entity is allegedly being 
guaranteed. There is nothing on the check indicating that 
either Ms. Horrocks or Sun Shine Secretarial agreed to 
guarantee any obligation of Accelerated Paving to Mickelsen 
Construction. Therefore the alleged guarantee agreement is 
void. 
Mickelsen Construction. Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396 at 
____ , 299 P.3d 203 at 209. (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, the arrangement between Mickelsen, Accelerated Paving, and Horrocks 
was a guarantee arrangement as evidenced by the fact there were two separate 
contracts. First, there was the contract between Mickelsen and Accelerated Paving for 
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performance of the construction work. Secondly, there was a subsequent contract 
entered into between Ms. Horrocks and Mickelsen wherein Horrocks wrote a check in 
payment on behalf of the primary obligor, Accelerated. The obligation of Accelerated 
was primary and the obligation of Ms. Horrocks was, at best, "collateral." More 
importantly, there was no evidence Ms. Horrocks had a business interest in the 
construction contract. There was no indication of a joint obligation typical of a surety 
arrangement. Typically, in a surety arrangement the primary obliger and the surety 
would enter into the same contract promising performance to the obligee. Both parties 
would have a business or financial stake in performance of the underlying construction 
contract. The Mickelsen case is the perfect example of an oral guaranty that is void. 
The Bailey, AMF, Peritus contract is the perfect example of a surety contract. There 
was only one contract, Peritus had a direct financial interest with a primary obligation to 
pay, not collateral. 
2. The Purpose of the Statute of Frauds. 
It is important to keep in mind the primary purpose of the Statute of Frauds. The 
Statute of Frauds is intended to prevent fraud, not to perpetrate fraud. In certain 
circumstances it is advisable to have an agreement in writing to protect someone from 
rash or unwise decisions. The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is not to discourage 
oral agreements under the proper circumstances. 
The Statute of Frauds was first enacted in England in 1677. 
Considering modern rules of evidence and business 
practice, there are some who believe that insofar as 
applicable to facts similar to those here, such statute has 
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outlived its usefulness. It is a two edged sword. It is argued 
that it may be used to perpetrate frauds as well as to prevent 
them. Under it a person may obtain to prevent them. Under 
it a person may obtain an oral promise to pay the debt of a 
third person and then resist payment on the ground that this 
promise is oral and therefore unenforceable under the 
Statute of Frauds. Because of this and other dangers, the 
courts of England and this country have sought to keep the 
Statute within its intended purpose. 
Gulf Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus, 354 S.W.2d 378 at 382 
(Tex. 1962). 
The Supreme Court of Texas also addressed the specific rationale for requiring 
contracts to be in writing where a third party is promising to pay the debt of another. 
The Statute of Frauds suretyship provision applies when a 
creditor seeks to recover from a guarantor because of a third 
person's failure to perform. The provision discourages false 
allegations that a person promised to pay if the primary 
debtor could not. The provision also protects those closely 
associated with the principal debtor for making rash or 
emotionally driven promises before having any real 
opportunity for awareness of the nature and magnitude of 
the risks undertaken. The suretyship provision, however, is 
not intended to provide more certainty to the terms of an oral 
contract for the benefit of a third person. Nor is it intended to 
discourage oral promises to assume the debt of a third 
person. 
Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates, No.11-0541 Supreme Court of Texas 
(Aug. 30, 2013). 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The Idaho legislature contemplated that contracts to answer for the debt of 
another can either be written or oral depending on the circumstances. 
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I.C. §9-505 Certain agreements to be in writing. 
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of 
another, except in the cases provided for in section 9-506. Idaho Code. 
There is no dispute a guaranty contract must be in writing. I.C. § 9-506(2) 
provides the "surety'' exception. A surety arrangement is similar to a guaranty in that 
they involve three parties, one obligee and two obligors. The difference between a 
surety and guarantor, both of whom are debtors, depends on the nature of their 
obligation. A surety is jointly and severally liable with the principal obliger. A guarantor 
only agrees to pay upon default of the principal obliger. In a surety arrangement the 
principal and surety typically sign the same agreement. A guarantor does not. The 
debt of a surety is original, primary, and direct. The liability of a guarantor is secondary 
and collateral, and its enforcement depends on certain conditions. Howell v. 
Commissionerv. Internal Revenue, 69 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1934). 
The "Main Purpose Rule" provides that the oral promise of a third party to pay the 
creditor of an original debtor is outside the Statute of Frauds when the promise is 
motivated "mainly" for his own economic benefit. The two concepts of the surety 
exception and the "Main Purpose Rule" are both recognized under Idaho law. The 
rationale for the two concepts is similar. In both cases, the third party promise is 
motivated to benefit the third party economically. In this case AMF was a start-up 
company financed by Peritus or by Peritus clients on the advice of Peritus. Peritus had 
a long history of continuous investment of money in AMF. Peritus had a vested interest 
in making AMF successful in order to make Peritus and its clients' money. The course 
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of conduct, discussion , and writings all prove the arrangement was not a guaranty. 
Under a guaranty, the guarantor would only be expected to pay after AMF defaulted. 
Instead, the evidence shows Peritus was continuously investing money, from 2004 to 
2012. This was not a guaranty arrangement and the Statute of Frauds does not apply. 
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